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Abstract—In this article, the design of secure lattice coset
codes for general wireless channels with fading and Gaussian
noise is studied. Recalling the eavesdropper’s probability and
information bounds, a variant of the latter is given from which
it is explicitly seen that both quantities are upper bounded by
(increasing functions of) the expected flatness factor of the faded
lattice related to the eavesdropper.
By making use of a recently developed approximation of the
theta series of a lattice, it is further shown how the average
flatness factor can be approximated numerically. In particular,
based on the numerical computations, the average flatness factor
not only bounds but also orders correctly the performance of
different lattices.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the wireless wiretap scheme two legitimate commu-
nication parties, Alice and Bob, exchange information in
the presence of an eavesdropper, Eve. In this setting, the
communication parties rely on physical layer security rather
than cryptographic protocols. Hence, Eve is assumed to have
no computational limitations and know the cryptographic key,
if any, but to have a worse signal quality than Bob.
The objective of code design in a wiretap channel is to
maximize the data rate and Bob’s correct decoding probability
while minimizing Eve’s information. It was shown in the
seminal paper of Wyner [1] that the legitimate parties can
design codes with asymptotically non-zero rate, zero error
probability and zero information leakage. Today, this setup
is particularly interesting in wireless channels that are open in
nature but vulnerable to distortions
As a practical construction of a wiretap code, [2] introduced
the general technique of coset coding, where random bits
are added to the message to confuse the eavesdropper. In
the specific case of a wireless channel, where lattice codes
are suitable, the code lattice Λb is endowed with a sublattice
Λe ⊂ Λb which carries the random bits [3].
A. Related Work and Contributions
The security of lattice coset codes can be quantized either
by Eve’s correct decision probability, or alternatively by the
mutual information of the message and Eve’s received signal.
For the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) channel, upper
bounds are known for both approaches [3], [4] and, more
importantly, both are increasing functions of the flatness factor
of the lattice Λe. Sequences of lattice coset codes achieving
security and reliability are also constructed in [4].
∗ Equal contribution.
For fading channel models, probability and information
bounds were derived in [5], [6], and [7], [8], respectively.
Codes achieving security and reliability in the multiple-input
multiple-output (MIMO) channel were given in [8]. In this
paper, we recall the strategy of [5], [6] and give a variant
of the information bounds. With this streamlined introductory
computation, we obtain bounds which are increasing functions
of the expected flatness factor of the faded lattice related
to the eavesdropper. The agreement of the probability and
information approaches is hence explicit, and a natural and
explicit generalization of the AWGN case. The computations
hold in any channel model with linear fading and Gaussian
noise. We remark that, to the best of our knowledge, the steps
towards practical code designs in low dimensions, such as [9],
are based on the probability bounds.
Motivated by this, we show how to use an approximation
of the theta series of a lattice, recently derived in [10], to
efficiently compute the average flatness factor of a given
lattice. Hence, we do not need to rely on further approxima-
tions for the information/probability bounds, e.g., the common
approach using the inverse norm sum in SISO channels [5].
We exemplify this in the Rayleigh fast fading channel, and
see an agreement between our numerical computations and
the geometric design heuristics and simulations results in [9].
In particular, this agreement supports the expectation that the
flatness factor not only bounds but also orders correctly the
performance of different lattices, hence serving as a design
criterion for practical low-dimensional constructions, as first
suggested in [5], [6]. Comparing to [9], where average flatness
factor heuristics are tested with simulations, our results suggest
that it is indeed approachable for design heuristics as well as
numerical computations.
II. LATTICES, THETA SERIES AND THE FLATNESS FACTOR
A lattice Λ ⊂ Rn is a discrete subgroup of Rn with the
property that there exist s ≤ n linearly independent vectors
(b1, . . . ,bs) of Rn such that
Λ =
s⊕
i=1
biZ.
We say that (b1, . . . ,bs) is a Z-basis of Λ, and call s ≤ n the
rank, and n the dimension of Λ. The lattice is full if s = n.
A lattice Λ′ ⊂ Rn such that Λ′ ⊂ Λ is called a sublattice
of Λ, and Λ is referred to as a superlattice for Λ′.
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For a convenient presentation, we define a generator matrix
MΛ := [b1 · · · bs] ∈ Mat(n× s,R), and equivalently write
Λ = {λ = MΛz| z ∈ Zs} .
Definition 1. Let Λ ⊂ Rn be a full lattice, and let λmin :=
minλ∈Λ\{0} ||λ||2 be its minimal norm. The lattice Λ is called
well-rounded if the set
{
λ ∈ Λ | ||λ||2 = λmin
}
contains n
linearly independent vectors.
The volume of Λ is defined to be νΛ = |det(MΛ)|, and
is independent of the choice of basis. If Λ is not full, then
νΛ = det(M
t
ΛMΛ)
1/2. The dual lattice Λ∗ of a full lattice Λ
is the lattice generated by MΛ∗ := (M−1Λ )
t = (M tΛ)
−1. We
can easily compute the volume of a sublattice1 Λ′ ⊂ Λ and of
the dual lattice Λ∗, as
νΛ′ = νΛ |Λ/Λ′| ; νΛ∗ = 1/νΛ,
where |Λ/Λ′| is the group index of Λ′ in Λ. Further, the
Voronoi cell associated with a lattice point λ ∈ Λ is the set
VΛ(λ) :=
{
x ∈ Rn| ||x− λ||2 ≤ ||x− λ′||2, λ′ ∈ Λ\ {λ}} ,
and V(Λ) := VΛ(0) denotes the basic Voronoi cell of Λ.
Definition 2. Let Λ be a lattice. The theta series (or theta
function) of Λ is the generating function
ΘΛ(q) :=
∑
λ∈Λ
q||λ||
2
.
The theta series ΘΛ(q) converges absolutely if 0 ≤ q < 1.
In this article, we will need to compute the theta series of
lattices which have been affected by random fading, i.e., with
random generator matrices. Unfortunately, there is no known
way of computing the theta series of a random lattice in closed
form. The following result is thus crucial for our purposes.
Proposition 1. [10, Prop. 1] Let Λ ⊂ Rn be a full lattice
with fundamental volume ν and minimal norm λmin. The theta
series ΘΛ (e−piτ ), as a function of τ , can be expressed as
ΘΛ
(
e−piτ
)
= 1 +
(piλmin)
n
2 +1τ
Γ
(
n
2 + 1
)
ν
∞∫
1
t
n
2 e−piτλmintdt+ Ξn,
where Ξn = Ξn(τ,Λ, L) denotes the error term.
We refer to [10] for a more detailed version of this result.
In Figure 1 we illustrate the accuracy of this approximation
for various famous lattices for which the theta series is known
in closed form and thus can be computed explicitly.
A. Lattice Sums and Flatness Factor
Let us denote the probability density function (PDF) of the
n-dimensional spherical Gaussian as
gn(x;σ) =
1
(
√
2piσ)n
exp
(
−||x||
2
2σ2
)
,
1The index |Λ/Λ′| is finite provided that dim(Λ) = dim(Λ′).
Fig. 1. Approximation of the theta series of the lattices Z2, D4 and the
Leech lattice Λ24, in dimensions n = 2, 4 and 24.
and its sums over a (possibly shifted) lattice Λ as
gn(Λ + x;σ) :=
∑
λ∈Λ
gn(λ+ x;σ).
We then have the identity
gn(Λ;σ) =
1
(
√
2piσ)n
ΘΛ
(
e−
1
2σ2
)
,
from which we see that gn(Λ;σ) only differs by constants
from the standard theta series. It is easy to see that gn(Λ+x;σ)
is Λ-periodic, and, for full lattices, it defines a PDF on the
Voronoi cell V(Λ), called the lattice Gaussian PDF.
The following definition is crucial for all subsequent results.
Definition 3. Let Λ ⊂ Rn be a lattice generated by MΛ ∈
Mat(n,R), with fundamental volume νΛ. The flatness factor
εΛ(σ) of Λ is defined as
εΛ(σ) = εMΛ(σ) := max
x∈Rn
∣∣∣∣gn(Λ +MΛx;σ)1/νΛ − 1
∣∣∣∣ .
The flatness factor was introduced in [4] as a wiretap
information tool and measures the deviation of the lattice
Gaussian PDF from the uniform distribution on V(Λ). As the
maximum of gn(Λ+x;σ) is attained for x ∈ Λ [4], the flatness
factor of a full lattice can be expressed in terms of theta series,
εΛ(σ) = νΛgn(Λ;σ)− 1 (1)
= ΘΛ∗
(
e−2piσ
2
)
− 1. (2)
Note that the additive group structure of a lattice is actually
crucial in this work: these important formulas are based on
the Poisson summation formula.
III. SYSTEM MODEL AND COSET CODES
We consider a wireless fading channel with noise. Perfect
channel state information is assumed at both receivers (CSIR),
Bob and Eve; the transmitter is only assumed to know the
channel statistics. As we are only interested in the eavesdrop-
per’s performance, we henceforth only consider the channel
between Alice and Eve, and consequently forgo subscripts in
the related quantities. Throughout this paper, random variables
are denoted by capital letters and their realizations with lower-
case letters. Denote Alice’s transmitted vector by x ∈ Rn, so
that the channel equation is given by
y = hx+ n,
where h ∈ Mat(m×n,R) is the realization of the fading, and
the noise vector N ∈ Rm is composed of i.i.d. components
Ni ∼ N (0, σ2). We assume that H has full rank almost surely,
but need not be a square matrix.
Remark 1. Typically a complex fading channel model is
considered, together with complex lattice codes. Such codes,
however, can be be reduced to the real case with double the
dimension. We consider here a real channel model since the
class of real lattices is wider than that of complex lattices, most
importantly including complex Z[e2pii/3] -lattices, and since
the average theta functions, to which both probability and
information bounds reduce, are already computed explicitly
[5], [6].
To confuse Eve, Alice uses lattice coset coding. An original
information vector thus corresponds not only to a lattice point,
but to an entire coset, and the transmitted vector is then chosen
randomly within the coset according to a distribution discussed
below. More specifically, Alice is equipped with two nested
lattices2 Λe ⊂ Λb ⊂ Rn, as well as an injective map from her
message space M of cardinality |M| = |Λb/Λe|, into the set
of unique coset representatives of Λb/Λe,
E :M→ Λb ∩ V(Λe), M 7→ λM .
Alice then chooses a representative of the coset class corre-
sponding to M at random, i.e., picks λe ∈ Λe and transmits
x = λM + λe ∈ (λM + Λe) ∈ Λb/Λe. The transmitted vector
now represents the original information bits, and in addition,
contains random bits which are encoded by Λe.
If x = MΛz for z ∈ Zn, then hx = hMΛz, and we can
think of a lattice code under fading with CSIR as a Gaussian-
channel lattice code where the code lattice realizes a random
lattice with generator matrix hMΛ. We will henceforth denote
the faded lattices Λb and Λe by Λb,h and Λe,h, respectively.
We denote the mutual information of two random variables
X,Y by I [X;Y ], and for double conditions given a third
random variable Z, we write I [X; (Y, Z)]. The metric of
interest is the information that Eve is able to extract from her
observations, i.e., I [M ; (Y,H)]. The fading H, noise N and
Alice’s message M are assumed to be mutually independent.
The settings considered in this article are:
1) Alice chooses coset class representatives uniformly at
random, and the channel is a mod Λs channel.
2) Alice uses Gaussian coset coding.
In the simplest setup, Alice chooses uniform representatives
from a finite transmission region, and Eve’s information is
affected by the boundaries of that region. Naively speaking,
if Eve has knowledge about the transmission region, she can
2The notation Λb, Λe is chosen to indicate that the message intended for
Bob is taken from Λb, while Λe is the lattice that is chosen to confuse Eve.
often guess the transmitted vector correctly if the received
vector lies outside of the transmission region. Our choice
of setups can be roughly seen as removing such boundary
effects by a modulo operation, and smoothing the boundary of
the transmission region, respectively. The AWGN information
bounds have been derived for these setups in [4], and the
information-theoretic results for the fading channels in [7],
[8] are for the Gaussian coset coding setup.
IV. INFORMATION AND PROBABILITY BOUNDS
Let Λb and Λe be of dimension n, and assume that Eve
simply decodes the received signal to the closest lattice point
in Λe,h. Then, probability of Eve correctly decoding the
message is upper bounded by [5], [6]
P [Decode correctly in Λe : Λb coset code]
=EH [P [Decode correctly in Λe,h : Λb,h AWGN coset code]]
≤EH
[
νΛb,hgn(Λe,h;σ)
]
= [Λb : Λe]
−1 (EH [εΛe,h(σ)]+ 1) . (3)
The first step is Fubini’s theorem and the independence of N,
H and M , while the second step follows from the probability
bound in the AWGN setup [3]. The bound is given for
Rayleigh fading single-input single-output (SISO) and MIMO
channels in [5] and [6], respectively. We recall that the flatness
factor is defined through (1) for non-full lattices as well.
We will give a variant of the information bounds [7], [8]
from which it is explicit that the bounds agree (up to constants)
with this upper bound on the probability that Eve correctly
decodes the message. Hence, to minimize this probability, it
will be necessary to minimize the upper bound on the mutual
information, and vice versa.
Lemma 1. [4, Lemma 2] Let Y be an Rn-valued random
variable with PDF ρY, and consider a message space M
such that |M| ≥ 4. Suppose that there exists some PDF ρ˜ in
Rn such that for all m ∈M, the variational distance
V (ρ{Y|M=m}, ρ˜) :=
∫
y∈Rn
|ρ{Y|M=m}(y)− ρ˜(y)|dny
is upper bounded3 by δ ≤ e−1/2. Then,
I [M ;Y] ≤ 2δ log(|M|)− 2δ log(2δ).
A. The mod Λs Wiretap Channel
We first consider a strategy where the boundary of the
shaping region set to be the boundary of V(Λs), where Λs
is a third lattice Λs ⊂ Λe ⊂ Λb ⊂ Rn, called the shaping
lattice. The random shifting vector λe is chosen uniformly at
random from the set of representatives of Λe/Λs in V(Λs).
Then, slightly artificially, we assume that Eve only receives
knowledge of the equivalence class y/Λs,h.
3This assumption is implicit in [4] but necessary, seen by taking δ →∞.
This yields a small difference between our and earlier information bounds.
Theorem 1. In the mod Λs channel setup, let the message M
have any distribution on the message space M of cardinality
|M| ≥ 4, and assume that EH
[
εΛe,h(σ)
] ≤ e−1/2. Then,
I [M ; (Y/Λs,h,H)] ≤ 2(e+ 1)EH
[
εΛe,h(σ)
]
log(|M|)
− 2EH
[
εΛe,h(σ)
]
log(2EH
[
εΛe,h(σ)
]
).
Proof. By the independence assumptions, we have the identity
I [M ; (Y/Λs,h,H)] = EH [I [M ; (Y/Λs,h|H = h)]] .
We divide Y into components Y⊥ and Y‖, perpendicular
and parallel to the nested lattices Λ∗,h. By the independence
assumptions, given H = h, Y⊥ is independent of the
transmitted lattice point and hence of the message M . Thus,
I [M ; (Y/Λs,h|H = h)] = I
[
M ; (Y‖/Λs,h|H = h)
]
. For a
fixed channel realization h, the channel is just a Gaussian
mod Λs,h channel. Then, given the message m, the projection
modulo Eve’s lattice, Y‖/Λe,h, has the lattice Λe,h Gaussian
distribution, of which the PDF of Y‖/Λs,h is simply a scaling.
Denoting ε = εΛe,h(σ), Lemma 1 and the trivial upper bound
log(|M|) on the mutual information yield
I [M ; (Y/Λs,h,H)]
≤ EH
[
1{ε≤e−1/2}(2ε log(|M|)− 2ε log(2ε))
]
+ EH
[
1{ε>e−1/2} log(|M|)
]
= PH
[
ε ≤ e−1/2]E{H|ε≤e−1/2} [2ε log(|M|)− 2ε log(2ε)]
+ EH
[
1{ε>e−1/2}
]
log(|M|).
We upper bound each of the summands separately. For the
first one, we apply Jensen’s inequality to the convex function
x log x and bound PH
[
ε ≤ e−1/2] ≤ 1, which yields
PH
[
ε ≤ e−1/2]E{H|ε≤e−1/2} [2ε log(|M|)− 2ε log(2ε)]
≤ 2E{H|ε≤e−1/2} [ε]
(
log(|M|)− log(2E{H|ε≤e−1/2} [ε])
)
≤ 2EH [ε] (log(|M|)− log(2EH [ε])) .
The second inequality holds since 0 ≤ E{H|ε≤e−1/2} [ε] ≤
EH [ε] ≤ e−1/2, and x log x is decreasing in this interval.
For the second term, we can use Markov’s inequality to get
EH
[
1{ε>e−1/2}
] ≤ EH [ε]
e−1/2
= 2eEH [ε] .
The result follows.
B. Discrete Gaussian Coset Coding
While an insightful scenario, the restrictions imposed in
the mod Λs channel setting are not necessarily realistic. To
be more general, we consider a second approach, where the
boundary is smoothed instead of removed. Here, the vectors
λe corresponding to the random bits are chosen so that the
message X = λM + λe follows the Gaussian distribution
centered on the shifted lattice Λe + λM , that is, for all
x ∈ Λe + λM ,
P [X = x] =
gn(x;σs)
gn(Λe + λM ;σs)
=: DΛe,λM (x;σs).
The parameter σ2s is called the shaping variance.
The following result, which can be regarded as a special
case of [8, Lemma 1] in our notation, is needed for the
generalization of the information bound to this second setting.
Lemma 2. Fix h ∈ Mat(m × n,R) and let X have the
centered discrete Gaussian distribution DΛe,λM (x;σs), where
Λe is full. Let N ∼ N (0, σ2Im) be a spherical (continuous)
Gaussian vector independent of X. Assume furthermore that
ε√
σ2/σ2sIn+h
thΛe
(σ) ≤ 1/2, where √· denotes matrix square
root. Then, the PDF ρ(y) of Y = hX+N and the PDF ρ˜(y)
of N (0, (σ2Im + σ2shht)),
ρ˜(y) =
exp
(− 12yt(σ2Im + σ2shht)−1y)
(
√
2pi)m
√
det(σ2Im + σ2shh
t)
,
have variational distance at most 4ε√
σ2/σ2sIn+h
thΛe
(σ).
Theorem 2. Consider the Rayleigh fading channel with dis-
crete Gaussian coset coding. Let the message M have any
distribution on the message space M of cardinality |M| ≥ 4.
Assume that E := EH
[
ε√
σ2/σ2sIn+h
thΛe
(σ)
]
≤ 18e . Then,
I [M ; (Y,H)] ≤ 8(1 + e)E log(|M|)− 8E log (8E) .
Proof. The proof closely follows the steps of that of Theo-
rem 1. We start by writing
I [M ; (Y,H)] = EH [I [M ; (Y|H = h)]] .
For a fixed channel realization h, by Lemma 2 the distribu-
tion of the received vector Y is close to a fixed Gaussian
distribution ρ˜ for all messages M , with variational distance
V
(
ρ{Y|M=m}, ρ˜
) ≤ 4ε(σ),
for ε ≤ 1/2. For the values h such that ε ≤ 18e we get an
information bound using Lemma 1. Otherwise, we have the
trivial upper bound log(|M|), yielding
I [M ; (Y,H)] ≤ EH
[
1{ε≤ 18e} [8ε (log(|M|)− log (8ε))]
]
+ EH
[
1{ε> 18e} log(|M|)
]
. (4)
The rest of the proof is identical to Theorem 1, using Jensen’s
inequality for the first, and Markov’s inequality for the second
summand to obtain termwise bounds which we can substitute
back to (4) to conclude the proof.
C. Observations
The information bounds tend to zero with the respective
average flatness factor. By the dual formula (2) for the flatness
factor, εΛ(σ) decreases monotonously to zero as σ → ∞ for
any Λ. As it only depends on ratios of the different parameters
σ, σs, σh, it is easy to deduce that the respective average
flatness factors also decrease monotonously to zero at poor
signal quality. Hence, the bounds prove information-theoretic
security for poor eavesdropper’s channel quality.
The information bound of Theorem 2 involves the quantity
E := EH
[
ε√
σ2/σ2sIn+h
thΛe
(σ)
]
.
In reasonable scenarios, we have σ2/σ2s  1, and it is easily
deduced that E →
σs→∞
EH
[
ε√hthΛe(σ)
]
= EH
[
εΛe,h(σ)
]
.
Hence, independent of the considered setup, the goal is to
design a lattice Λe so that EH
[
εΛe,h(σ)
]
is minimized. We
remark that this quantity only depends on Λe and σh/σ, not
for example on Λb. Using (1), we can also compute
EH
[
εΛe,h(σ)
]
= |Λb/Λe|EH
[
νΛb,hgn(Λe,h;σ)
]− 1,
which coincides up to constants with the probability bound
(3). This is an important agreement of the probability and
information approaches.
We also point out that the agreeing probability bound (3) has
been analyzed with error terms in [5] and is asymptotic at poor
signal quality. We thus expect the average flatness factor to
predict and correctly order the performance of different lattices
at the interesting low-SNR regime.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In the following, we make use of Proposition 1 to ap-
proximate the average flatness factor of different lattice coset
codes numerically. The aim is to compare the predictions
of our theta approximation to lattice design heuristics and
channel simulations given e.g., in [9]. We focus on the SISO
Rayleigh fading channel to allow for a comparison with the
results obtained in [9], and hence restrict the choice of channel
matrices h to diagonal matrices.
Even if Eve’s information only depends on Λe, to ensure a
meaningful comparison between codes we fix a superlattice Λb
(i.e., fix Bob’s vector decoding error probability) and the in-
dex4 |Λb/Λe| to match the information rate. For convenience,
we define the variable τ = 1/(2piσ2), and consider εΛ as a
function of τ . In the limit of large and small values of τ ,
our quantity of interest of two different lattices of equal index
converge to the same value. Hence, we will center our attention
to a range of τ where a difference is visible, which in our plots
corresponds to a very large range of values for σ2.
Remark 2. It has been recently shown in [9] that in or-
der to minimize the expression (3) for the SISO channel,
the property of the considered lattice being well-rounded is
favorable. As will be visible from the following simulation
results, this criterion is also key for minimizing the average
flatness factor. When comparing orthogonal lattices of fixed
volume, this reduces to taking a (close to) square lattice, i.e.,
dZn is expected to perform best among lattices with diagonal
generator matrix and fixed volume ν = dn.
We start by comparing two 2-dimensional lattices, Λ1 and
Λ2 in Figure 2, with generator matrices
MΛ1 =
[
4 0
0 4
]
,MΛ2 =
[
1 0
0 16
]
,
which we interpret as index-16 sublattices of Λ = Z2. Some
characteristics of these lattices are summarized in Table I.
4As we are fixing a common superlattice fixing the index is equivalent to
comparing sublattices of the same volume.
n = 2 λmin #{λ ∈ Λ | ||λ||2 = λmin} WR Index
Λ1 16 4 Yes 16
Λ2 1 2 No 16
TABLE I
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE LATTICES IN DIMENSION n = 2.
Fig. 2. Average flatness factor of Λ1 and Λ2.
The choice of MΛ2 is deliberately bad, hence from the
observation in Remark 2 it is not surprising that Λ1 exhibits
a lower average flatness factor than Λ2. The difference can
be as large as 3 dB, which is remarkable without further
optimization. This example allows already to hint that both the
property of being well-rounded as well as having a shortest
vector which is as long as possible is advantageous for mini-
mizing the average flatness factor. This statement will become
clearer from the subsequent, more interesting examples.
n = 4 λmin #{x ∈ Λ | ||x||2 = λmin} WR Index
Π1 8 24 Yes 32
Π2 1 2 No 32
Ω1 4 4 No 256
Ω2 16 8 Yes 256
Ω3 20 12 Yes 256
Γ1 4 2 No 302
Γ2 22 12 Yes 302
TABLE II
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE LATTICES IN DIMENSION n = 4.
We consider Π1 = 2D4, a scaled version of the checker-
board lattice, as an index-32 sublattice of Z4, and compare
its average flatness factor to another index-32 sublattice Π2 of
Z4. The generator matrices are given by
MΠ1 = 2 ·

−1 1 0 0
−1 −1 1 0
0 0 −1 1
0 0 0 −1
 ,MΠ2 =

2 0 −2 −2
3 −5 −2 3
−4 8 4 −4
−6 5 0 −7
 .
In a recent article [9], the authors analyze the performance
of three different index-256 sublattices of Z4 with respect to
Eve’s decoding error probability. We denote the lattices by Ω1,
Ω2 = 4Z4, and Ω3, with generator matrices given by
MΩ1 =

16 0 0 0
0 4 0 0
0 0 2 0
0 0 0 2
 ,MΩ2 =

4 0 0 0
0 4 0 0
0 0 4 0
0 0 0 4
 ,MΩ3 =

−2 −3 4 −1
0 −1 0 3
0 −3 −2 −3
−4 −1 0 −1
.
In Figure 3 we compare all five presented lattices with respect
to their average flatness factor. Note that as remarked above,
only a comparison between lattices of the same index is
meaningful. The comparison between Π1 and Π2 again agrees
Fig. 3. Average flatness factor of Π1, Π2, and of Ω1, Ω2, Ω3.
with what should be expected. Note that it is known that D4
attains the maximum possible length of the shortest vector
among lattices in dimension 4, and is moreover well-rounded.
The order of the lattices Ωi, 1 ≤ i ≤ 3, agrees with
the results obtained in [9]. We note that Ω1 and Ω2 respect
the statement from Remark 2, but their difference is almost
negligible. The well-rounded lattice Ω3, however, is up to 1-
1.5 dB ahead of Ω2.
In addition, we compare two index-302 sublattices of Z4,
of respective generator matrices
MΓ1 =

−1 1 2 2
−1 0 2 −5
1 −2 5 −1
−1 −5 1 2
 ,MΓ2 =

1 1 3 −2
−4 1 0 −4
−1 −2 3 1
2 −4 2 −1
 .
Fig. 4. Average flatness factor of Γ1 and Γ2.
As in the previous examples, the well-rounded lattice Γ2
exhibits a smaller average flatness factor than Γ1, and the
difference reaches up to 2 dB. This is in agreement with the
simulation results obtained in [9].
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We studied the design of secure lattice coset codes in a
general wireless model with any fading and Gaussian noise,
and focused on the mod Λs channel as well as on Gaussian
coset coding. Recalling the eavesdropper’s probability bounds
[5], [6] and deriving a variant of the information bounds [7],
[8] we saw that both are an increasing function of the average
flatness factor, i.e., the theta series of the faded eavesdroppers
lattice Λe,h averaged over channel realizations h.
We then computed numerically the average flatness factors
of different faded lattices with help of an approximation of
the theta series of a lattice derived in [10]. By making use
of this result, computing the average flatness factor becomes
computationally inexpensive, which allows us to avoid further
additional approximations based e.g., on the inverse norm sum.
As already suggested [9], our findings show that the property
of being well-rounded, is necessary in order to minimize the
average flatness factor and, hence, the upper bound on the
eavesdropper’s information. All our numerical computations
agreed with the channel simulations in [9].
Interesting further topics of investigation include the more
detailed design of optimal secure lattice codes and, for SISO
channels, the construction of sequences of codes where the
information tends to zero. In both of these cases, well-rounded
lattices studied in [9] will likely play a central role.
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